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THE COURTS' DISCRETION IN ASSESSING 

FEES UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS 

ATIORNEy'S FEES AWARDS ACT OF 1976 

Lmda F Thome* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Civil Rights Attorney s Fees Awards Act of 19761 provIdes 
for an award of fees to the prevailing party by the court "in its dis­
cretIon. In order to assess the bounds of thIS discretIon, it IS nec 
essary first to examme the ongm of the Act and the context m 
whICh it was passed. 
The Act was direct congressIOnal reactIon to the United States 
Supreme Court's declSlon m Alyeska Pipeline Sermce Co. v. 
Wilderness Socfety 2 That deCISIOn abruptly ended the federal 
courts practIce of awarding attorney s fees to prevailing partIes m 
CIvil nghts and other public mterest cases under the pnvate attor 
ney general doctrme where there was no express statutory authon­
zatIon for such awards. It also resulted m an mconsistency m the 
availability of fee awards m suits brought under the federal CIvil 
nghts laws because some statutes provIded for fees while others 
did not. 3 
The legIslatIve hIstory of the Act makes clear that its purpose 
was to remedy anomalous gaps and to achIeve conSIstency m 
Staff Attorney Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law' B.A., UnIver­
sity of ChIcago, 1972; J.D., George WashIngton UnIversity, 1978. 
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). The statute proVIdes In relevant part: 
In any action or proceeding to enforce prOVISIOn of sections 1981, 1982, 
1983, 1985, and 1986 of thIS title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or In any 
CIvil action or proceeding, by or on behalf of the United States of Amenca, 
to enforce, or chargIng VIOlation of, proVISIOn of the United States Inter­
nal Revenue Code, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, In 
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, 
reasonable attorney fee as part of the costs. 
Id. 
2. 421 U.S. 240 (1975). 
3. Among those statutes with prOVISIOn for fees are: Titles II, and VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b), 2000e-5(k) (1976); Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1968, Id. § 3612(c) (1976); the Emergency School AId Act of 1972, 
20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976); and the Voting Rights Act ExtenSIOn of 1975, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 19731(e) (1976). 
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our CIvil nghts laws. 4 The prOVISIOn was to be mterpreted m ac­
cordance with the eXIstmg case law under both the earlier statutory 
prOVlSlons and the JudicIally fashIOned pnvate attorney general doc­
tnne. 5 The courts have recogmzed thIs legIslative desIre to achIeve 
consIstency and have generally adopted, as controlling, the pnnCI­
pIes whICh were established under the fee provlSlons of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act. Thus, Newman v. Piggte Park Enterpnses 6 and 
Johnson v. Georgta Highway Express, Inc. 7 and other cases under 
Title II and Title VII of the 1964 Act, are repeatedly cited by 
courts seekmg standards for fee awards under section 1988. The 
legIslative hIstory also recogmzes the compelling need for fee 
awards m CIvil nghts actions as a part of the overall federal enforce­
ment scheme. 8 The reasonmg m the Senate Report echoes that of 
4. S. REP No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976), repnnted In [1976] 5 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5908. 
5. The Idea of the pnvate attorney general" IS not new one, nor are at­
torneys fees new remedy. Congress has commonly authonzed attorneys 
fees ill laws under whlCh pnvate attorneys general" play significant role 
m enforcmg our poliCies. 
These fees shifting prOV1SlOns have been successful m enabling vigor­
ous enforcement of modern Civil nghts legislation, while at the same time 
limiting the growth of the enforcement bureaucracy. Before May 12, 1975, 
when the Supreme Court handed down its declslOn m Alyeska Pipeline 
Serolce Co. v. Wilderness SocIety, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); many lower Federal 
courts throughout the Nation had drawn the ObVlOUS analogy between the 
Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts and these modern Civil nghts acts, and, fol­
lowmg CongresslOnal recognition m the newer statutes of the pnvate attor­
ney general" concept, were exerclsmg their traditional equity powers to 
award attorneys fees under early Civil nghts laws as well. 
These pre-Alyeska deClslOns remedied gap m the specific statutory 
prOV1SlOns and restored an Important hlstonc remedy for Civil nghts vlOla­
tions. 
It IS mtended that the standards for awarding fees be generally the same 
as under the fee prOVlSlOns of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. A party seekmg to 
enforce the nghts protected by the statutes covered by S. 2278, if successful, 
should ordinarily recover an attorney fee unless special Clrcumstances 
would render such an award unjust. Newman v. Piggle Park Enterpnses, 
Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (footnotes omitted). 
S. REP., supra note 4, at 3-4, reprinted In [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 
5908, 5910-12. 
6. 390 U.S. 400 (1968). 
7. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). 
8. All of these Civil nghts laws depend heavily upon pnvate enforcement, 
and fee awards have proved an essential remedy if pnvate citizens are to 
have meamngful opportunity to vmdicate the Important CongresslOnal pol­
ICies whlCh these laws contam. 
285 1979] ASSESSING FEE AWARDS 
the Supreme Court m Newman. 9 
The reality of cIvil nghts litIgatIon confirms the Importance of 
pnvate enforcement and the need for adequate fee awards. Dunng 
the year ending June 30, 1978, over mnety-eight percent of all cIvil 
nghts actIons filed m federal distnct courts were brought by pn­
vate plamtiffs.lO These cases may take years to resolve,l1 wIth re­
peated demands upon the bme, resources, and skills of plamtiffs 
counsel. Issues, both legal and factual, are complex, often re­
qumng the testImony of one or more expert witnesses as well as 
paralegal aSSIstance m prepanng for tnal. 12 Costs are correspond­
mgly hIgh. Finally even m seemmgly clear-cut cases, success can­
not be assured as legal standards are constantly reexammed by the 
courts. 13 
In many cases anSIng under our Civil nghts laws, the citizen who must 
sue to enforce the law has little or no money with whICh to hire lawyer. If 
pnvate citizens are to be able to assert their Civil nghts, and if those who VI­
olate the Nation fundamental laws are not to proceed with Impunity, then 
citizens must have the opportunity to recover what it costs them to Vindicate 
these nghts In court. 
S. REP supra note 4, at 2, repnnted In [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 
5908,5910. 
9. When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was eVident that en­
forcement would prove difficult and that the Nation would have to rely In 
part upon pnvate litigation as means of secunng broad compliance with 
the law. A Title II suit IS thus pnvate In fonn only When plaintiff bnngs 
an action under that Title, he cannot recover damages. If he obtains an in­
Junction, he does so not for himself alone but also as pnvate attorney gen­
eral, Vindicating policy that Congress conSidered of the highest pnority 
If successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attorney 
fees, few aggneved parties would be In position to advance the public in­
terest by invoking the Injunctive powers of the federal courts. Congress 
therefore enacted the proVISIOn for counsel fees-not Simply to penalize liti­
gants who deliberately advance arguments they know to be untenable but, 
more broadly, to encourage indiViduals Injured by raCial discnmlnation to 
seek JudiCial relief under Title II. 
390 U.S. at 401-02 (footnote omitted). 
10. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REpORT OF THE 
DIRECTOR A-16, table C.2 (1978). 
11. For example, an employment discnmlnation class action was brought under 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act; suit was filed In 1966, tnal was held In 1974, 
and, In 1977 plaintiffs moved for an award of mtenm attorneys fees; the case IS not 
yet resolved. James V. Stockham Valve & Fitting Co., 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977). 
12. In one title VII case tned In 1979, tnallasted 3 weeks and reqUired the tes­
timony, for plaintiffs, of computer programmer, statistician, and an mdustnal psy­
chologist. Exhibit preparation reqUired the assistance of 11 temporary employees, 
who worked over penod of several months to analyze over 40,000 documents. The 
case has been pending since 1972. Pegues MiSSISSIPPI State Employment Serv., 
No. 72-4-8 (N.D. Miss. 1979) (under adVisement July 27 1979). 
13. The Burger Court has made number of Inroads Into established" JudiCial 
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The result of these factors IS that manv plamtiffs and attorneys 
are reluctant to start down the uncertam path of litIgatIon. While 
many cIvil rIghts cases may be resolved qUIckly and with little ex­
pense, it may be difficult to distmgUIsh, m advance, the sImple 
case from the one whICh will reqUIre multIple appeals and years to 
close. Because few cIvil rIghts plamtiffs can afford to pay theu at­
torneys as well as the costs of litIgatIon as the proceedings con­
tmue, most attorneys must wait until the final resolutIon of the 
case to get theIr fee and to recover theu own disbursements. Even 
then, of course, fees and costs will be awarded only if the plamtiff 
prevails. To add to thIS uncertamty by limitmg the CIrcumstances 
under whIch fees are to be awarded or by limitmg the award itself 
would undermme the mtent of the Act. It would, mdeed, under 
mme the entIre legIslatIve cIvil rIghts mandate, whICh the Con­
gress has made dependent upon prIvate litIgatIon. 
The Senate Report recogmzed that m a practIcal sense, the ex 
pectatIon that the cIvil rIghts laws will be enforced by prIvate litI­
gants relies upon the ability of those litIgants to attract competent 
counsel. 14 The adversary system itself IS based on the assumptIon 
that both partIes to litIgatIon will be represented by attorneys capa­
ble of presentmg theIr clients positIOns m the most favorable pos­
ture. The gUIding pnnciple m determmmg fee awards must be to 
place the serVIces of a plamtiffs CIvil rIghts lawyer on a par with 
those of counsel m comparably difficult areas of law 15 
II. DETERMINING WHETHER TO AWARD ATTORNEYS FEES 
The Supreme Court's declSlon m Newman limited the Court's 
discretIOn m decIding whether to award fees to prevailing plamtiffs 
m cases brought under Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.lS 
One who succeeds m obtammg an mJunctIon under that Title 
should ordinarily recover an attorney s fee unless speCIal Circum­
prmclples m the Civil nghts area. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. U.S., 
431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
14. S. REP supra note 4, at 6, reprtnted In [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 5908, 5913. 
15. It IS mtended that the amount of fees awarded under S. 2278 be gov­
erned by the same standards whICh prevail m other types of equally com­
plex Federal litigation, such as antitrust cases and not be reduced because 
the nghts mvolved may be nonpecumary m nature. In computing the 
fee, counsel for prevailing parties should be paid, as IS traditional with attor­
neys compensated by fee-paymg client, "for all time reasonably expended 
on matter. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
16. 390 U.S. at 402. 
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stances would render such an award unJust. "17 ThIS holding was 
extended by the Court to fee awards under title VII In Albermarle 
Paper Co. v. Moody 18 and to awards under section 718 of the 
Emergency School AId Act of 197219 In Northcross v. Board of Ed­
ucatwn.20 The Senate Report cites Newman and states that thIs 
pnnciple should also apply under section 1988. 21 
Accordingly most of the controversy In the lower courts has 
ansen with regard to the definitIOn of the specIal circumstances 
whIch would render such an award unJust. In addition, some 
courts have held that a fee award IS Inappropnate where the plam­
tiff has sought only damages rather than Injunctive relief. Finally 
others have confronted the problem of whether federally funded le­
gal serVICes groups are entitled to an award. 
Some courts have found such a specIal circumstance where 
the defendant has relied upon a state law or agency ruling m mam­
tammg the policy whICh the plamtiff has successfully challenged. 
ThIS situation typICally occurs m sex discnmmatIon actions concern­
mg retirement plans or female protective laws. 22 The Ninth Circuit, 
however, rejected thIS rationale m Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific 
Co 23 
Under umque CIrcumstances m Sprogts v. United Atr Ltnes24 
fees were demed. There, the Seventh Circuit upheld the distnct 
court's demal of fees when it found that the real party In mterest m 
the suit was not the named plamtiff but rather her umon, whICh 
had retamed counsel and borne all the expenses of the litigation. 
17 Id. 
18. 422 U.S. 405 (1975). 
19. 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976). 
20. 412 U.S. 427 (1973). 
21. S. REP supra, note 4, at 4, reprinted In [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 5908, 5912. 
22. Chastang V. Flynn & Emrich Co., 541 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1976); Williams V. 
General Foods Corp., 492 F.2d 399 (7th Cir. 1974). 
23. 519 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1975). 

Reading § 713(b) to bar allowance of attorneys fees whenever good faith re­

liance could be shown would deter pnvate suits challengmg suspect EEOC 

Interpretations of Title VII. At best, such suits are unattractive to pnvate liti­

gants. The Issues are often complex; the deference accorded the agency m­

terpretatIon of its govermng statute makes success unlikely Yet it IS particu­

larly Important that pnvate litigants submit such Issues to the courts for 

determmation, for the agency itself will not do so. The agency declined to 

proceed In thiS case, for example, but thiS prIvate litigation resulted In 

hIghly significant contribution to the effective enforcement of the Act. 

Id. at 529-30. 
24. 517 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. HI75). 
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Further the actIon was found to be a CIrcumventIon of a settle­
ment agreement whICh the umon and the defendant had reached 
shortly before filing a test case desIgned In conjunctIon with other 
litIgatIon InvolvIng the same substantIve Issues. Because the de­
fendant had not known of the umon s positIon and mIght have had 
a different strategy if it had, the court held it to be unfau to assess 
fees agamst it. The court found three additIonal factors militatmg 
agaInst a fee award: 
1. The case was not tYPICal of the CIvil nghts claIms usually 
brought by public mterest orgamzatIons; 
2. the attorneys fees claIm was not related to the damages re­
covered; and 
3. m light of the other litigation pending, the declSlon III the 
case had little precedenhal value. 25 
The latter two conSIderatIons are more commonly factors whICh 
courts examme In determInIng the amount of a fee award. Interest­
mgly the Seventh Circuit's evaluatIon of the precedentIal value of 
the case has proved to be Incorrect. SprogfS IS frequently cited and 
IS a leading sex discnmInatIon case under title VII. 
A second Issue ansIllg III the use of the Newman standard IS 
whether the Newman mandate applies only to cases In whICh an Ill­
JunctIon, rather than monetary relief alone, has been achIeved. At 
least three cucuits have answered thIS questIon III the affirmative 
and have approved the demal of fees, reasomng that no public Ill­
terest has been served or that the plaIntiff's monetary recovery 
would be suffiCIent to pay hIS attorney 26 In Parham v. Southwest­
ern Bell Telephone Co. 27 the Eighth Circuit recogmzed that thIS 
reasomng mIght be myopIC. Although no InjunctIon had Issued, the 
court found that the lawsuit acted as a catalyst, leading the defen­
dant to comply voluntarily Therefore, the plaIntiff was entitled to 
a fee award. 
The Seventh Circuit's mIstaken prediction of the precedentIal 
value of Sprogfs IS Illstruchve III thIS regard. It may be difficult for 
a court or for the parties to Judge the Impact of a gIven case, either 
as precedent or III its effect upon the defendant's future actIOns. 
25. Id. at 391. 
26. Buxton Patel, 595 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1979) (42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976)); 
Zarcone Perry, 581 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1978), cen. demed, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979) 
(§ 1988); Reid MemphiS Publishmg Co., 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975) (title VII). 
27. 433 F.2d 421, 429-30 (8th Cir. 1970) (title VII). 
28. 595 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1979) (42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976)). 
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For example, In Buxton v. Patel,28 a fau hOUSIng case, the court 
found that the discnmInatIon suffered by the plaIntiffs was an Isola­
ted IncIdent, with no IndicatIon of broader VIOlatIons generally af­
fectIng the public. There was no consIderatIon of the effect that 
case mIght have In preventIng future Isolated InCIdents regarding 
the same defendant, or more pervaSIve discnmmatIon by other 
landlords who mIght hear about the lawsuit. Indeed, the award of 
monetary relief In a CIvil nghts case may often have a much greater 
Impact on the public Interest than the Issuance of an InJunctIon, by 
deterrIng conduct SImilar to the defendant's by others who WIsh to 
protect theIr pocketbooks. 
In Sargeant v. Sharp 29 the First Circuit squarely rejected the 
contentIon that the plaIntiff's ability to pay hIs attorney s fee out of 
an award of damages should be a factor m the deCISIOn to award or 
not to award a fee. Ability to pay IS a factor whICh may be conSId­
ered only In settIng the amount of the fee or In makIng the award 
to the plaIntiff rather than to the attorney 
Finally it should be noted that m adoptIng the Newman 
standard, the Senate Report omitted all reference to any reqUIre­
ment that the plaIntiff obtaIn an InjunctIon In order to tngger the 
presumptIon of entitlement to a fee award. Instead, it refers only 
to the necessity of success In seekmg to enforce the nghts pro­
tected by the statutes covered. "30 
A thud Issue relatIng to the award of fees was spawned by the 
statute s preclUSIOn of fee awards to the federal government. Be­
cause many legal serVIces and CIvil nghts groups are at least par 
tIally federally funded, it IS argued that they too, must be demed 
fees. The Second Circuit resolved thIS questIon In Equal Employ­
ment Opportumty Commtsswn v Steamfitters Local 638,31 where 
it upheld the tnal court's fee award to the NatIonal Employment 
Law Project (NELP). Although NELP receIved money from the 
Equal Employment Opportunity CommIsSIOn (EEOC), the court 
reasoned that NELP was not the federal government. Moreover it 
could not be known how long the orgamzatIon s federal funding 
would contInue,32 or whether Congress mIght not have Intended 
that such groups become self-sustaInIng through recovery of attor 
29. Sargeant Sharp, 579 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1978) (42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976». 
30. S. REP supra note 4, at 4, reprmted In [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 5908, 5912. 
31. 542 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 911 (1977). 
32. In fact, it termmated m 1978. 
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neys fees. 33 The court of appeals, however did approve the lower 
court's reduction of the fees to be awarded to NELP The questIOn 
of the amount of fee awards to federally and prIvately funded or 
gamzatIons IS a live one. 
The trIal courts discretIon, then, m determmmg whether to 
award fees, has been substantially limited. The courts of appeals 
have not hesitated to reverse and remand the demal of fees where 
there was msufficlent JustificatIOn for it. 34 
III. DETERMINING THE AMOUNT OF THE FEE A WARD 
The courts have much greater discretIon m determmmg the 
amount of a fee award then m decIding whether to make an award 
at all. The legIslatIve hIstory of the Act, nevertheless, makes it 
clear that there are certam conSIderations whIch must be taken mto 
account. First, the prOVISIOn for fee awards was mtended to act as 
an mcentIve to attract competent counsel to cIvil rIghts litIgatIOn. 
Fee awards are to be governed by the same standards prevailing m 
other complex federal litIgatIon. 35 Second, the Senate Report cited 
Johnson 36 as settmg forth the proper standards37 and stated that 
these standards had been correctly applied m Stanford Daily 
33. See also Hoitt v. Vitek, 495 F.2d 219, 220 (1st Cir. 1974) (pnvate attorney 
general doctnne) (held no abuse of discretion to deny fees to federally funded Le­
gal Aid Society where pnvate counsel was also assOCiated and received an award). If 
no pnvate counsel had been mvolved, however, the First Circuit stated that award to 
the Legal Aid group would have been reqUired. Id. at 221. 
34. See, e.g., Bunn v. Central Realty of La., 592 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1979) (trial 
court must conSider 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976)); Gore v. Turner, 563 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 
1977) (award not to be denIed because no proof of value of services presented at trial 
or because no proof of plamtiffs ability to pay); Brown v. Culpepper, 559 F.2d 274 
(5th Cir. 1977) (award not to be demed because conduct was negligent rather than 
mtentional). 
35. S. REP supra note 4, at 6, repnnted 'n [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 5908, 5913. 
36. 488 F.2d at 714. 
37 488 F.2d at 717-19. Johnson, title VII case, set forth the followmg twelve 
factors to be conSidered: 
(1) The time and labor reqUired; (2) ilie novelty and difficulty of the ques­
tions; (3) the skill reqUisite to perform the legal service properly' (4) the pre­
clUSIOn of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; 
(5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee IS fixed or contingent; (7) time 
limitations Imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount m­
volved and the results obtamed; (9) the expenence, reputation, and ability of 
the attorneys; (10) the undesirability of the case; (11) ilie nature and 
length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards m 
Similar cases. 
Id. 
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v. Zurcher 38 Van Davts v. County of Los Angeles 39 and Swann v 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educatwn. 40 
In Stanford Daily the court awarded a fee of $50 per hour for 
750 hours and added a bonus of $10,000 because of the conhn­
gency of success and because the case mvolved novel Issues whIch 
were well presented by counse1. 41 The total award was $47,500. 42 
It rejected arguments that the award should have been reduced 
because the plamtiffs did not succeed m obtammg all of the relief 
they sought. Determmmg that fees should be awarded for all tIme 
reasonably computed to promote theIr clients mterests, the court 
reasoned that it should not reqUIre attorneys to foresee "the exact 
parameters of the courts willingness to grant relief. 43 
The Van Davts44 court also awarded a bonus, attributed to the 
excellent results and difficulty of the case as well as the conduct of 
the plamtiffs attorneys. It refused to reduce the award because the 
plamtiffs did not prevail on all Issues, adoptmg the positIon that 
fees should be awarded for all tIme reasonably expended. 45 Nor 
was the fee reduced because two of the attorneys worked for a 
non-profit public mterest law firm. The total award was reduced 
slightly by $1,000 because of duplicatIon of effort and by 25 hours 
or $875 because of poor record-keepmg by one lawyer The total 
award of $60,000 mcluded $9,670 for paralegal and law clerk tIme 
at $10 per hour $3,268.68 for expenses, and $7 193.32 for a result 
charge or bonus. Attorneys were awarded $35 to $60 per hour 46 
In Swann, the total award exclUSIve of expenses was $175,000 
for more than 2,700 hours of attorney tIme. 47 The court found it Ir 
relevant that the plamtiffs had no contractual obligatIon to pay 
theIr attorneys and that the NAACP Legal Defense Fund had con­
tributed expenses and nommal fees to the litIgatIon. 48 
In additIon to the Johnson gUIdelines, some courts have fol­
lowed antitrust cases 10 whICh fee awards have been made under 
38. 64 F.RD. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974). 
39. 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. ~ 9444, at 5047 (C.D. Cal. 1974). 
40. 66 F.RD. 483 (W.O. N.C. 1975). 
41. 64 F.RD. at 688. 
42. [d. 
43. [d. at 684. 
44. 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. at ~ 9444, at 5047 
45. [d. at 5049. 
46. ld. at 5048. 

47 66 F.RD. at 486. 

48. [d. 
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the equitable fund doctnne49 for gUIdance m determmmg the 
amount of a fee award m a cIvil nghts achon. The leading case IS 
Lmdy Bros. Builders of Philadelphta v. Amencan Radiator & Stan­
dard Samtary Corp. 50 In Lmdy I, the Third Circuit held that m 
computIng the amount of attorneys fees under the equitable fund 
doctnne, the number of hours spent should be multiplied by some 
hourly rate reflectmg the complexity and novelty of the Issues, the 
quality of the work, and the amount of the recovery obtaIned. 51 
The Third Circuit applied Lmdy II to an award of fees under sec­
hon 1988 m Hughes v. Repko 52 holding that the first step m 
amount determmatlOn was to establish a "lodestar The calculation 
of the lodestar mcludes a determInation of the serVIces to be recog­
mzed, that IS, how much time should be Included, as well as the 
appropnate hourly rate. ConsIderations of the complexity or diffi­
culty of the litigatIOn and of the extent to whICh the party prevailed 
are mcluded In calculatIng the lodestar Further adjustments are 
made In accordance with the purposes of the Act and the standards 
set forth mJohnson and Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel. 53 
Finally other courts have adopted the award standards set 
forth m the ABA s Code of ProfessIOnal Responsibility 54 whICh are 
not apprecIably different from the standards suggested In Johnson. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Distnct of ColumbIa Circuit 
has developed a novel approach to settIng the amount of fee 
awards m cases agaInst the federal government whICh IS a step re­
moved from the Johnson and the ABA standards. In Copeland v. 
Marshall,55 a panel of that court held that, rather than begmnmg 
with an hourly rate and number of hours worked on the case, the 
mqUIry should begm with an exammatIOn of the firm s overhead 
costs and reasonable profit margms. The panel was particularly 
concerned about the relationshIp between the fee award and the 
plamtiff's or class s back pay recovery 
49. The equitable fund doctnne provides for compensation to those who have 
undertaken an action whICh has resulted m benefit to others. The others benefited 
are accordingly requITed to contribute to the plamtiffs attorney fees. 
50. 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973) (Lmdy I), appeal from remand, 540 F.2d 102 
(3d Cir. 1976) (Lmdy II). 
51. Id. at 168. 
52. 578 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1978). 
53. 503 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
54. See Waters v. Wisconsm Steel Works of Int'I Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309 
(7th Cir. 1974). 
55. 18 Fair EmpJ. Cas. 468 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (reheanng en banc scheduled Oct. 
21, 1979). 
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With the exceptIon of the Copeland deCISIOn with respect to 
fee awards agaInst the federal government, there IS general agree­
ment as to the factors whICh should be conSidered. There IS consid­
erable vanatIon, however, In the extent to whICh the appellate 
courts will Inject themselves Into the process itself. Nearly every 
court recites its acknowledgement that the amount of the award IS 
withIn the tnal court's discretIon. 56 Yet some courts have taken a 
much more active role than others In reVieWIng the methods by 
whICh the tnal Judge sets the award. The Second Circuit, for exam­
ple, reqUires that a heanng be held and that the claim be fully 
documented. 57 The First,58 ThIrd,59 and Fifth60 Circuits reqUire 
findings or some statement of the reasons for the award. In con­
trast, both the Fourth61 and Ninth62 Circuits have upheld lower 
court fee determInations whICh were challenged because no find­
Ings or reasons were Issued. Close appellate review of course, IS 
dependent upon the eXistence of a record below 
The appellate courts vary Widely In theIr treatment of fee 
awards whICh have been challenged by one of the parties. In Allen 
v. Amalgamated Transit Umon,63 the distnct court awarded a fee 
of $300 or $4.54 per hour The Eighth Circuit reversed, calling the 
award grossly madequate, and recommending to the tnal court the 
standards set out m Johnson. ThiS example, of course, IS an ex­
treme one. The distnct court apparently Simply chose a dollar 
amount with little reference to any of the Johnson factors. 
In another Eighth Circuit case, Brown v. Bathke 64 the tnal 
56. See, e.g., King New Hampshne Dep't of Resources and EconomlC Dev., 
562 F.2d 80 (1st Cir. 1977) (distnct court IS clearly the best Judge of what constitutes 
reasonable fee"); Waters Wisconsm Steel Works of Int'I Harvester Co., 502 
F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974) (analYSIS whlCh encompasses conSideration of ABA 
standards well withm bounds of discretion); Brito Zia, Inc., 478 F.2d 1200 (10th 
Cir. 1973) (hours not the sole baSIS for determmmg fees, the court usmg its discre­
tion sets reasonable fee); Schaeffer San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002 
(9th Cir. 1972) ("large discretion m tnal Judge recogmzed); Lea v. Cone Mills, 467 
F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1972) (appellate court will not overrule unless clearly wrong"); 
Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals, 442 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1971) (reasonableness left to 
the sound discretion of the tnal Judge). 
57. Beazer New York City Transit Auth., 558 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1977), rev d on 
other grounds, 99 S. Ct. 1355 (1979). 
58. Sargeant Sharp, 579 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1978). 
59. Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d at 488-89. 
60. Morrow Dillard, 580 F.2d 1284 (5th Cir. 1978). 
61. Lea Cone Mills, 467 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1972). 
62. Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, 462 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1972). 
63. 554 F.2d 876 (8th Cir.), cert. dented, 434 U.S. 891 (1977). 
64. 588 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1978). 
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court had awarded fees only for the tIme expended on the Issue on 
whICh the plamtiff had prevailed. ThIs policy of mechamcally divId­
mg tIme spent on mterrelated Issues was rejected by the court of 
appeals as mconsistent with the liberal purposes of the Act. Al­
though the extent to whICh the plamtiff prevailed was a relevant 
factor, its conSIderation was to be m accord with the pnncipies of 
Van Davts65 as adopted by the Senate Report,66 that attorneys fees 
should not be demed solely because the claIm did not prOVIde the 
preCIse basIs for the relief granted. 67 
The Second Circuit, m Beazer v. New York City Transtt Au­
thonty 68 upheld a fee award of $310,000, but reversed a premmm 
of $50,710. Because the tnal court had met all of the reqmrements 
of a hearmg and full documentatIOn of the claim, the fee award it­
self was upheld. The premmm, however, was held to be an abuse 
of discretIon. Although the factual Issues were complex, the legal 
Issues were faIrly SImple and the benefits to the class were not con­
crete. The court was candidly concerned about the SIze of the total 
award and adverted to an earlier pronouncement that fees should 
be scrutImzed with an eye to moderatIon. 
In King v. Greenblatt 69 the First Circuit upheld the tnal 
court's award of $50 per hour or $4,000. In domg so, the appellate 
court reversed an earlier case m whICh it had held that the CnmI­
nal Justice Act rates of $30 for m-court and $20 for out-of-court 
tIme were appropnate for awards m CIvil nghts cases. 70 The au­
thority for thIS positIon was the legIslative hIstory of section 1988, 
whICh had been passed m the mtenm.71 
65. 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. at ~ 9444, at 5047 
66. S. REP supra note 4, at 6, reprinted In [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 	5908, 5913. 
67 588 F.2d at 637. 
68. Beazer New York City Transit Auth., 558 F.2d 97 (2d CiT. 1977), rev don 
other grounds, 99 S. Ct. 1355 (1979). 
69. 560 F.2d 1024 (1st CiT. 1977). 
70. Souza Travlsono, 512 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir.), vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975) 
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(I) (1976)). 
7l. Not only has Congress now prOVided for attorney fees awards In Civil 
nghts cases, the Act' legislative history leaves no doubt that Congress in­
tended not only that the fees be adequate enough to attract competent 
counsel" but "that the amount [would] be governed by the same 
standards whICh prevail In other types of equally complex Federal litigation 
such as antitrust cases. Mechamcal application of the Cnmmal Justice Act 
fee scale obVIOusly does not meet these critena, and we shall therefore no 
longer reqUire adherence to Souza. 
560 F.2d at lO26 (quoting S. REP supra note 4, at 6, reprinted In [1976] 5 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5908, 5913). 
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After the distrIct court concluded that the hours expanded by 
counsel were excessive and thereby reduced the award from 231 to 
150 hours, the plamtiffs m Norwood v. Harnson 72 appealed. The 
Fifth Circuit upheld the award because the Johnson factors had 
been fully considered m its determmatIon. 
The problems of calculatmg a fee award vary with every case. 
The court must determme whether the time spent was exceSSive, 
to what extent and m what way the final result should affect the 
award, and at what rate the attorney s time should be valued. Each 
of these consideratIOns depends upon the umque ClTcumstances of 
each case. As long as these Circumstances are evaluated withm the 
Johnson framework, mechamcal formulae for allocatmg time among 
Issues are aVOided, and a reasonable rate IS set. The balancmg of 
the factors IS then generally left to the court's discretion. 
72. 581 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1978). 
